Russia Conducted Drone Surveillance of European Nuclear Facilities Over 18 Months
Russia mounted drone surveillance of European – Recent investigations suggest the Russian government organized a covert drone surveillance operation targeting nuclear installations in the UK, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands over a 18-month span, according to researchers. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) reported that 144 incidents were analyzed, revealing Russian intelligence had operated with “substantial impunity” across more than a dozen nations. This campaign left European authorities caught off guard, with few defenses successfully countering the unmanned aerial threats.
Awareness of Strategic Weakness
The IISS findings highlight a gap in NATO air defenses, which were primarily designed for conventional military threats. Despite repeated drone sightings over military bases and airports, Western forces failed to intercept or destroy the craft, exposing vulnerabilities in their systems. European governments, though aware of the activity, have been cautious in publicly linking it to Russia, though officials confirmed they would support the report’s release.
Key Targets of the Surveillance Campaign
Among the focal points of the operation were RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk, a UK base preparing to host US nuclear weapons, and France’s Île Longue, home to its sea-launched nuclear missile arsenal. In late November 2024, unusual drones were observed flying low over RAF Lakenheath and RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, alongside at least two other US Air Force installations in England. By July 2025, US nuclear weapons had been deployed at Lakenheath, raising concerns about the potential for intelligence gathering during their presence.
The drones were likely launched from shadow fleet vessels operating near the UK and France. The Seasons 1 tanker, stationed in the North Sea near Essex, and the Hav Dolphin, a cargo ship in Hull, were both suspected of participating in these missions. The Hav Dolphin was also linked to drone activity at a German submarine base in May 2025. These vessels, equipped with transponder systems turned off, enabled covert operations by masking their movements from radar detection.
European Nations’ Response
European authorities demonstrated a lack of preparedness, as highlighted by a police helicopter’s attempt to track drones over the UK. On one occasion, the helicopter retreated for safety, with the option of deploying an anti-drone laser “suggested but ultimately not progressed.” This hesitation underscores a broader issue in the region’s defensive capabilities, particularly against low-cost, low-altitude drones.
The IISS report also noted that shadow fleet vessels were not only used for launching drones but also served as recovery ships or signal repeaters. These roles were informed by tactics first developed during the Ukraine conflict, showcasing Russia’s adaptability in asymmetric warfare. Charlie Edwards, a senior IISS fellow, emphasized that the Kremlin’s coordination of these unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) spanned more than a dozen NATO countries and Ireland, marking a significant strategic achievement.
Motivations Behind the Campaign
Russian objectives for the surveillance mission are believed to include nuclear reconnaissance, mapping military supply chains, and psychological warfare. The report suggests the operation aimed to gather intelligence on Europe’s nuclear capabilities while simultaneously undermining confidence in NATO’s defenses. The use of drones, which are small, cost-effective, and difficult to detect, allowed Russia to conduct prolonged incursions without immediate retaliation.
Incidents peaked in late 2025, with over 30 drone sightings recorded in September and another surge in November. These events included close calls at critical installations like Kleine-Brogel airbase in Belgium and Volkel in the Netherlands, where US air-launched nuclear weapons are stored. At the time, Russia-linked shadow fleet vessels were active in international waters, further complicating efforts to trace the drones’ origin.
Operational Tactics and Outcomes
The IISS analysis indicated that drones were frequently launched from “dark sailing” vessels—ships operating without transponder signals—to evade detection. These craft were likely supported by other vessels that assisted in signal relay or recovery, enhancing the effectiveness of the operation. “It is our assessment that it is highly likely the Kremlin conducted a coordinated UAV campaign over Europe,” Edwards stated. He described this as a “series of tactical successes” for Russia and a “strategic failure of allied defences,” which were not optimized for modern drone threats.
By 2026, drone activity had begun to decline as European navies intercepted and seized shadow fleet vessels. In September 2025, four tankers were spotted near Denmark, including the Boracay, which was later captured by French commandos. The boarding of the Boracay revealed its Chinese captain and two Russian nationals from the Moran Security Group, a private military company tied to Russia. This discovery confirmed the military use of shadow fleet vessels, transforming them from hypothetical tools into operational assets.
Implications for NATO and Europe
The report underscores the need for NATO to modernize its air defense systems, particularly to address the growing threat posed by drones. While the campaign’s impact on nuclear facilities remains uncertain, its success in evading detection and operating undetected highlights a shift in Russia’s strategic approach. “The identification of two Russian private military contractors confirmed the militarisation of shadow fleet tankers, not as hypothesis but as operational practice,” the IISS concluded, attributing the campaign to the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency.
As the number of drone sightings decreased after the seizure of shadow fleet vessels, the operation’s scale and secrecy became more apparent. The persistence of such activities over 18 months demonstrates Russia’s ability to exploit gaps in European defenses, using drones as both a tool of espionage and a means of testing NATO’s readiness. This campaign not only raises questions about current security measures but also signals a potential escalation in the use of unmanned systems for strategic objectives.
Broader Context of the Surveillance Efforts
Other incidents included the closure of Copenhagen Airport in September 2025 due to drone activity, which forced temporary disruptions in air traffic. These events collectively illustrate a pattern of coordinated surveillance, with Russia leveraging its maritime assets to project influence across the continent. The quiet acknowledgment of this failure by European governments suggests a growing recognition of the need to adapt to new threats, even as the Kremlin continues to refine its tactics.
The sustained nature of the operation highlights Russia’s commitment to long-term intelligence gathering, blending military and economic strategies. As the campaign progressed, it became evident that drones were not just a temporary measure but a calculated effort to undermine European security. This has prompted calls for enhanced cooperation among NATO members to counter such threats, ensuring that the same vulnerabilities are not exploited in the future.
