Lula says Brazil will not be treated like ‘tinpot country’ after US designates gangs as terrorists
Lula Says Brazil Will Not Be Treated as a ‘Tinpot Country’ After US Designates Gangs as Terrorist Organizations
US Action Sparks Political Shift in Brazil
Lula says Brazil will not be treated - Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio da Silva, has expressed strong opposition to the United States’ decision to classify two of the nation’s most influential criminal groups as foreign terrorist organizations. The move, announced by Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Thursday, has drawn sharp criticism from Lula, who emphasized that Brazil will not be reduced to a ‘tinpot country’ in the eyes of international powers. The designation of the First Capital Command (PCC) and the Red Command has been interpreted as a blow to Lula’s administration, particularly as it coincides with the upcoming October presidential election.
“We do not accept being treated like little boys. We do not accept being treated as if we were some tinpot country,” said Lula during a speech in Sergipe. He added, “It is deplorable that members of the Bolsonaro family once again travel to the United States to advocate foreign intervention in Brazil, as they did over the tariffs, which caused so much damage to our country.”
Lula’s campaign has been vocal in its resistance to the U.S. designation, framing it as an attack on Brazilian sovereignty. In a statement, he described the move as an affront to the nation’s autonomy, arguing that the PCC and Red Command are already effectively countered through domestic efforts. The president also criticized the Bolsonaro family, labeling them “traitors” and “false patriots,” for their perceived alignment with American interests.
Flávio Bolsonaro Seizes the Momentum
The designation has been a boon for Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former president Jair Bolsonaro and the primary rival of Lula in the October election. Flávio, who was chosen to run in his father’s stead due to the latter’s house arrest following a conviction for attempting a coup, has leveraged the U.S. decision to bolster his political standing. His recent visit to Washington, where he met with Donald Trump and Rubio, has been highlighted as a strategic campaign move.
“On a trip as a presidential candidate, we did more for Brazil and for the security of Brazilians than Lula,” Flávio claimed in a statement after the U.S. announcement. Earlier, he had shown his willingness to align with American policies, even suggesting that the U.S. could take direct action in Brazil’s waters. In a letter to U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, he wrote, “Wouldn’t you like to spend a few months here helping us combat these terrorist organizations?”
The timing of the U.S. decision has been seen as a calculated effort to undermine Lula’s credibility. Flávio’s campaign had recently faced a setback after a scandal involving a $26.8 million bribe was revealed. The incident, in which he was recorded asking a corrupt banker for funds to finance a documentary about his father, led to a sharp decline in his public support. Now, with the new designation, Flávio has regained some of his momentum, positioning himself as a defender of national security against perceived foreign threats.
Origins and Operations of the Criminal Groups
The PCC and Red Command, both of which emerged from Brazil’s prison system, have long been recognized for their violent and expansive operations. The Red Command traces its roots back to the 1970s, when political prisoners and common criminals in Rio de Janeiro’s prisons formed a coalition to resist torture and abuse under the military dictatorship. This group has since evolved into one of Latin America’s most powerful criminal networks, with activities spanning drug trafficking, extortion, and armed conflict.
In contrast, the PCC was established in the 1990s in São Paulo after a violent police crackdown killed 111 prisoners in a separate prison. This event, which occurred months before the PCC’s founding, sparked a rebellion that led to the creation of a highly organized structure. Today, both gangs are key players in the cocaine trade, exporting drugs from neighboring countries like Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to the United States and Europe. Their influence extends globally, with operations in regions as far as Africa and Southeast Asia.
While the Red Command operates with a more decentralized leadership style, akin to the drug cartels of Mexico and Colombia, the PCC functions with a corporate-like hierarchy. This distinction has been noted by analysts, who argue that the PCC’s methodical approach to business and crime makes it a unique threat. However, both groups compete for control of trafficking routes, often clashing in violent confrontations. The U.S. designation aims to highlight their role in global drug distribution, though critics say it overlooks Brazil’s broader efforts to combat such organizations.
Federal Police Operation and Lula’s Sovereignty Stand
Just hours before the U.S. announcement, Brazil’s federal police launched a new operation targeting the PCC’s infiltration of the financial sector. The move was intended to showcase domestic efforts to counter the gangs, which Lula had previously praised. In his response, the president reiterated his stance on national sovereignty, stating, “Any international cooperation to combat criminal factions will be welcome… But we will not accept arbitrary measures imposed from abroad being used as a pretext to attack our sovereignty and our economy.”
Lula’s administration has consistently defended its ability to manage the gangs without external interference. He stressed that the designation risks undermining Brazil’s independence, particularly in economic and diplomatic arenas. The U.S. decision, which follows similar classifications in Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, has been widely anticipated, with political analysts noting the strategic timing. However, the lack of mention of this during Trump’s meeting with Lula has been seen as a missed opportunity for dialogue.
The PCC and Red Command have become central to discussions about Brazil’s security and governance. Their origins in prisons reflect a deep-rooted issue in the country’s criminal justice system, where violence and corruption have historically been intertwined. The gangs’ ability to evolve into transnational organizations underscores the complexity of the challenge they pose. Despite their scale, Lula argues that Brazil has successfully addressed these groups through its own initiatives, making the U.S. intervention seem unnecessary and politically motivated.
Broader Implications for Brazil’s International Relations
The U.S. designation carries implications beyond domestic politics. It signals a shift in how the country is perceived on the global stage, with some viewing the move as an effort to assert influence over Brazil’s internal affairs. Analysts suggest that the U.S. may be using the classification to justify military or economic intervention in the region, a strategy that aligns with its approach in other Latin American nations.
Lula’s response has also highlighted tensions between Brazil and the U.S. over issues like trade policies and human rights. The recent focus on the gangs could be part of a broader pattern of using security concerns to pressure Brazil into adopting policies favorable to American interests. However, Lula remains firm in his belief that the country’s sovereignty must be upheld, regardless of external pressures. His call for national pride resonates with many Brazilians, who see the designation as a symbolic attack on their nation’s autonomy.
As the October election approaches, the political stakes have never been higher. The U.S. action has not only amplified Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign but also galvanized Lula’s supporters. The divide between the two leaders—rooted in their approaches to security, economics, and international relations—has been exacerbated by this decision. With the PCC and Red Command continuing their operations, Brazil’s future will likely hinge on how its leaders navigate the balance between domestic security and global cooperation.