UK prioritised ties with UAE over averting mass atrocities in Sudan, MPs to be told

UK Prioritised Ties with UAE Over Averting Mass Atrocities in Sudan, MPs to Be Told

UK prioritised ties with UAE over - According to a parliamentary select committee hearing, the UK government was aware of Ethiopia’s support for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as early as 2024. Intelligence reports indicated the Ethiopian involvement in the genocidal conflict, yet the information was not shared publicly to avoid tensions with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This decision, revealed by Nathaniel Raymond, an American human rights investigator, suggests the UK’s diplomatic priorities may have influenced its response to the crisis in Sudan.

MPs to Be Told of UK’s Strategic Priorities

Raymond, director of Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL), will present evidence at a hearing on Tuesday, highlighting how the UK’s relationship with the UAE took precedence over addressing atrocities. During a May 2024 meeting, FCDO officials informed him that the UAE’s “private pressure” compelled the government to withhold information linking Ethiopia and the RSF. The data, which showed Ethiopia’s backing of the militia, was kept confidential to maintain diplomatic ties.

The role of Ethiopia in Sudan’s civil war was only made public in early 2026, despite the UK having knowledge of its involvement earlier. Ethiopia continues to deny any role in the conflict, though the evidence Raymond uncovered points to its active participation. The committee’s inquiry into the UK’s atrocity prevention efforts stems from reports in The Guardian about the FCDO’s response to the RSF’s capture of El Fasher in 2025. Raymond’s testimony will focus on how the UK downplayed the scale of the massacre in El Fasher to avoid political fallout.

Raymond’s Testimony and Data Analysis

In his written testimony, Raymond stated that the UK government was “more interested in preserving relations with the Emiratis than averting mass atrocities.” He will argue that the FCDO officials sought to obscure the truth about the RSF’s actions, particularly the systematic killing of civilians in El Fasher. The city fell to the RSF after an 18-month siege, and Raymond’s team estimated that at least 60,000 people were killed during the assault.

“I explained the math. I stated that, in reality, the number of people that the RSF systematically killed after capturing the city could have been higher,” Raymond said in his testimony.

Raymond explained that his initial estimate of 60,000 deaths did not account for casualties from famine or the RSF’s bombardment during the siege. He noted that the FCDO official he spoke with was concerned about the figure being too high. “I came to believe that this estimate of at least 60,000 people killed by the RSF was a political problem for the FCDO,” Raymond added.

The committee will also hear about the HRL’s encrypted communications with FCDO officials over three years. Raymond’s analysis of mobile phone data revealed a connection between Ethiopian and RSF operations. The HRL tracked handsets moving between Addis Ababa and RSF-held areas in Sudan. Some devices, he claims, were transferred to UAE-linked addresses, suggesting a network of shell companies tied to the RSF’s deputy commander, Abdul Rahim Dagalo.

Deliberate Evasion of Detection

Raymond’s evidence includes a case where a phone was moved from Addis Ababa to Abu Dhabi in just four hours, despite no official air traffic records or scheduled flights matching the route. This deliberate action, he argues, was an attempt to hide the RSF’s support network. The FCDO officials requested that Raymond release the data publicly, as the UK government could not do so itself.

“They told me that the UK was facing significant private pressure behind the scenes from the UAE, limiting its ability to affect the situation,” Raymond stated.

Raymond explained that the HRL had to keep the data confidential to protect its sources and operational methods. However, the lab secretly shared the findings with the US to bolster sanctions against Dagalo-linked entities. This move underscored the UK’s strategic focus on maintaining alliances while downplaying the RSF’s role in the crisis.

Public Exposure and Rebuttals

The involvement of Ethiopia in Sudan’s conflict became widely known in February 2026 after Reuters reported that Addis Ababa was hosting a training camp for RSF fighters. The report, supported by the UAE, revealed Ethiopia’s active role in the war. Despite this, Ethiopia has consistently denied participation, maintaining that its actions were neutral or defensive.

Raymond’s testimony will also address the FCDO’s efforts to mitigate the impact of the RSF’s operations. He claims that the UK’s failure to act was tied to its reliance on UAE support, which complicated its ability to address the humanitarian crisis. The committee’s investigation aims to evaluate how the UK responded to reports of mass killings, with a particular focus on El Fasher’s fall in 2025.

Raymond emphasized that the FCDO’s hesitation to act was not due to a lack of evidence but rather a fear of undermining the UAE’s influence. “The UK’s political priorities dictated its response, even as the RSF’s actions escalated,” he said. This dynamic, he argued, created a conflict between the government’s diplomatic goals and its moral obligation to prevent large-scale violence.

Broader Implications for Atrocity Prevention

The hearing raises questions about the UK’s commitment to atrocity prevention in the face of geopolitical interests. Raymond’s analysis of encrypted messages and meeting notes reveals a pattern of suppression and selective disclosure. The FCDO’s officials, he said, were more focused on maintaining relationships with the UAE than on revealing the full extent of the RSF’s atrocities.

Raymond’s work highlights the challenges of independent reporting when intelligence agencies are influenced by external pressures. The HRL’s data, which included phone records and internal communications, provides a detailed account of how the UK’s diplomatic ties shaped its humanitarian response. By withholding critical information, the government may have allowed the RSF to continue its campaign of violence with minimal consequences.

As the committee delves deeper into the UK’s actions, the testimony will serve as a key piece of evidence in assessing the role of international alliances in conflict zones. Raymond’s findings suggest that the UK’s strategic priorities in the Middle East may have overshadowed its responsibility to protect civilians in Sudan. The hearing could lead to a broader discussion on how diplomatic relationships influence humanitarian decisions and the accountability of governments in preventing mass atrocities.

Raymond’s revelations also point to the UAE’s indirect role in the conflict. The HRL’s tracking of phones linked to UAE facilities indicates that the emirates may have been instrumental in supplying weapons or logistical support to the RSF. This connection, he said, was critical to understanding the scale of the RSF’s operations and the UK’s complicity in allowing them to proceed without public scrutiny.

The testimony underscores the importance of transparency in international relations. By keeping information about Ethiopia’s support for the RSF under wraps, the UK may have delayed action that could have saved thousands of lives. Raymond’s analysis of the data, combined with his interactions with FCDO officials, paints a picture of a government balancing political alliances with humanitarian obligations.

As the committee continues its investigation, the findings will have implications for the UK’s foreign policy and its approach to conflict resolution. Raymond’s evidence challenges the notion that the UK acted in good faith, suggesting instead that its decisions were shaped by considerations of diplomacy and economic interests. The hearing could mark a turning point in the UK’s accountability for its role in Sudan’s ongoing crisis.